Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
研究立法规则如何通过提供提案人身份信息影响谈判结果，发现当议员能提前排除部分提案人时，所有经济剩余必然归首位提案人，这揭示了透明度可能加剧权力失衡。
The rules and procedures of legislatures often provide legislators with information bearing on the identities of upcoming proposers. For a broad class of legislative bargaining games, we establish that Markovian equilibria necessarily deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer whenever the information structure permits the legislators to rule out some minimum number of proposers one round in advance. This result holds regardless of the recognition process and even if players vary in patience and risk aversion. It raises the possibility that procedures adopted in the interest of transparency may contribute to the imbalance of political power.