The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core
扩展了关于估值均衡与成本份额均衡同核心之间关系的研究，证明了估值均衡的两个福利定理，并指出在有限代理人经济中这两个集合不等价。
We extend the results of Mas-Colell (1980) and Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost share equilibria with the core. We allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. We show the two welfare theorems for valuation equilibrium, the inclusion of the set of cost share equilibria in the core, and the nonequivalence of these two sets for an economy with a finite number of agents. In the case that the set of public projects is endowed with a topological structure, we provide conditions under which the price system needed to decentralize a Pareto efficient allocation as a valuation equilibrium is continuous.