The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel
研究了加拿大魁北克省零售汽油市场在竞争局调查后合谋瓦解的过程，发现高利润和不对称价格调整是合谋特征，调查公告后利润下降、价格调整更对称。
We study the collapse of collusion in Q uébec's retail gasoline market following a C ompetition B ureau investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins, and asymmetric price adjustments. Using weekly, station‐level prices we test whether collusion was successful, and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel's strategy. We do so in the markets targeted by the investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar pre‐collapse pricing (cyclical markets). Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical markets), and adjustments became more symmetric.