Income distribution, transaction costs and market fragmentation in informal credit markets
研究了财富分配不均和基础设施不足环境下，非正规信贷市场因交易成本和信息优势导致的非价格封闭和信贷配给现象，并以菲律宾农业部门两类放贷者为例验证了数量封闭规则。
In an environment characterized by inequitable wealth distribution and limited market-infrastructural institutions, the trust component of credit transactions is founded on personal relations. Through these, information and transaction costs advantages are provided; but also control and unequal bargaining power can be exercised. In the informal sector, transaction and information costs will lead to non-price closure in credit markets, while behavioral differences in lenders will lead to manipulation of prices as well as of quantities. The quantity-closure rules are modeled and tested for two types of informal lenders in the agricultural sector of the Philippines, the trader-lenders and the farmer-lenders. It is found that the two groups of lenders systematically sort their borrowers and ration credit. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.