A Clarification of Theories and Evidence on Supplier-Induced Demand for Physicians' Services
简化并扩展了医生诱导需求的理论，指出在不完全竞争且代理关系不完整的市场中诱导必然存在，并澄清了以往研究中混淆分析单位导致的误解，重新解释证据表明医生诱导需求的能力比普遍认为的更受限制。
This article both simplifies and extends the literature on physician-induced demand. It shows that inducement should be expected in all imperfectly competitive markets that are also characterized by incomplete agency relationships. More important, it argues that confusion over the extent of the inducement phenomenon has been created by several contributions that fail to distinguish between the effects of changes in physician-population ratios on changes in the individual physician's output, and the effects on per-capita utilization. In particular, it demonstrates that, by confounding units of analysis, the major empirical results found in recent articles by Rossiter and Wilensky are contradicted by their model. Their evidence, however, together with findings from other studies, are reinterpreted to suggest that physicians are even more constrained, than is generally believed, in being able to induce increases in demand.