Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank
建模银行间市场的系统性风险，分析银行流动性冲击、协调失败和单个银行破产如何影响整个银行体系，并探讨中央银行在防止支付系统连锁反应中的作用。
We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidity needs as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure (gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bank is insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking system to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure of one bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. We analyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification of the Too-big-to-fail-policy.