Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle
研究信贷约束与市场价格挂钩时产生的系统性外部性，导致私人过度借贷，并通过两部门DSGE模型量化分析，发现提高借款成本可恢复效率并减少金融危机。
Credit constraints linking debt to market-determined prices embody a systemic credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and constrained socially optimal equilibria, inducing private agents to overborrow. This externality arises because private agents fail to internalize the financial amplification effects of carrying a large amount of debt when credit constraints bind. We conduct a quantitative analysis of this externality in a two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a small open economy calibrated to emerging markets. Raising the cost of borrowing during tranquil times restores constrained efficiency and significantly reduces the incidence and severity of financial crises.