Wage Rivalry and Insider-Outsider Relations: Evidence for Skilled and Unskilled Men in Denmark
利用工会竞争模型推导工资反应函数，估计丹麦熟练与非熟练男性的工资决定，发现短期差异显著，但工资螺旋启动后部分差异消失，非熟练男性工资受内部人-外部人效应影响。
A model with trade union rivalry is used to derive wage reaction functions, which are then estimated for skilled and unskilled men in Denmark. The results show substantial differences in wage determination between the two groups of workers in the short term, but once the wage-wage spiral starts to operate, some of the differences disappear. Wage setting for unskilled men is subject to insider-outsider effects, whereas it is uncertain whether wage determination for skilled workers suffers from such imperfections. Copyright 1992 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.