An Overlapping Generations Model of Wage Determination
用一个多期世代交叠模型解释工资随工龄上升和年资规则的原因，发现劳资谈判中全体工人会偏向老工人，使其获得更高工资和更多工作保障。
This paper provides a novel explanation of rising wage profiles and seniority rules. It is argued that whenever a firm bargains over a wage-employment package with its whole work force, a steady-state contract favors older workers. The reason is that old workers have no interest in improving the conditions of "young workers," while young workers do care about the treatment given to "old workers." Therefore, the work force as a whole displays a bias toward older workers, giving them higher wages as well as more job security. These results are derived in an n-period overlapping generations model and the effects of a shock to the firm's revenue function are analyzed. Copyright 1990 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.