Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection
研究了保险公司或医疗服务提供者在选择低风险客户与提高生产效率之间的权衡，发现最优偿付方式是按人头付费和按服务付费的混合，且纯按人头付费会引发强烈的风险选择行为。
The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply-price analog to the demand-price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion. Under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon. The presence of contracting costs in a Rothschild-Stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome.