Reputation and Time Consistency
证明基于触发策略的声誉论证可广泛解决政府政策的时间不一致问题，并构建了一个包含同质家庭、无内生状态变量的稳态经济模型，表明无限期模型中的触发策略均衡优于单期模型均衡。
Recent work has shown that reputational arguments based on trigger strategies can sometimes be used to deal with the problem of time inconsistency in government policy.' This idea was exploited by Robert Barro and David Gordon (1983) in a model of inflation and by V. V. Chari and Patrick Kehoe (1988) in a model of capital taxation. Here it is shown that reputational arguments of this sort are widely applicable.2 A general policy model is developed, based on an economy that is stationary over time, contains identical households, and has no endogenous state variables. It is shown in general that the infinite-horizon version of this model has equilibria in trigger strategies that yield outcomes strictly better than those attainable as equilibria in the one-period model.