Conspiracies and secret price discounts in the marketplace: Evidence from field experiments
通过实地实验研究市场中的合谋行为，发现当卖家能合谋且价格信息完全时，价格显著高于竞争水平；不完全信息下结果居中；有经验的买家能抑制反竞争定价。
We explore collusion by using the tools of experimental economics in a naturally occurring marketplace. We report that competitive price theory adequately organizes data in multilateral decentralized bargaining markets without conspiratorial opportunities. When conspiratorial opportunities are allowed and contract prices are perfectly observed, prices (quantities) are considerably above (below) competitive levels. When sellers receive imperfect price signals, outcomes are intermediate to those of competitive markets and collusive markets with full information. Finally, experienced buyers serve as a catalyst to thwart attempts by sellers to engage in anticompetitive pricing: in periods where experienced agents transact in the market, average transaction prices are below those realized in periods where only inexperienced agents execute trades.