Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score
研究发现长期持股的机构投资者通过提升运营效率持续改善企业F-Score，而其他机构则降低F-Score，且监督型机构改善财务健康后，短期机构会据此交易。
Abstract The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.