Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions
分析对称寡头市场中容量受限企业在无限重复多单位统一价格拍卖中的默契合谋，发现统一价格拍卖比歧视性拍卖更容易维持完全合谋，且容量保留可能是必要的。
This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity‐constrained firms. Under two popular definitions of the uniform price, when each firm sets a price‐quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price‐quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal collusion is attained with simple price‐quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding.