ALTERNATING MONOPOLY AND TACIT COLLUSION*
研究了企业如何利用交替垄断策略作为默契合谋工具，在特定环境下该策略优于经典的市场分享策略，甚至成为唯一合谋均衡。
Abstract This paper considers the use of the alternating monopoly strategy (AMS) as a (tacit) collusion device. We show that firms may choose this strategy in particular environments, when other collusive strategies are also feasible. In particular, we stress how the presence of an observable move (entry), distinct from the competitive stage (price setting), can serve as a coordination device, reducing monitoring costs in incomplete information environments. The paper thus shows that AMS may be preferable to the classic market sharing strategy (MSS) and in some cases it is the only collusive equilibrium.