Taming Systemically Important Financial Institutions
研究了系统重要性金融机构因太大或关联性太强而不能倒的问题，提出通过征收系统性税和设立系统性风险管理局来提供保险、避免道德风险，对监管者和政策制定者有参考价值。
We model a systemically important financial institution that is too big (or too interconnected) to fail. Without credible regulation and strong supervision, the shareholders of this institution might deliberately let its managers take excessive risk. We propose a solution to this problem, showing how insurance against systemic shocks can be provided without generating moral hazard. The solution involves levying a systemic tax needed to cover the costs of future crises and more importantly establishing a systemic risk authority endowed with special resolution powers, including the control of bankers’ compensation packages during crisis periods.