INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?*
在双寡头信息性广告模型中，研究企业半合谋广告的动机及其福利影响，发现半合谋虽提高利润但损害福利，且广告成本低时比价格合谋更损害福利，对竞争政策有启示。
In a duopoly version of the Grossman and Shapiro [1984] model of informative advertising, I examine firms' incentives to semicollude on advertising and the welfare implications thereof. I find that, relative to the noncooperative outcome, semicollusion on advertising is more profitable but is detrimental to welfare. I also find that when the advertising cost is ‘low,’ advertising semicollusion is more harmful to welfare than price semicollusion. These findings are important for competition policy since traditionally, cooperative advertising is not treated in the same light as price collusion.