One‐Stop Shopping Behavior, Buyer Power and Upstream Merger Incentives
研究了消费者一站式购物偏好如何影响零售商与供应商之间的纳什谈判关系，发现这种偏好通过双重加价效应和谈判效应两种相反机制影响上游合并激励，买方势力足够大时供应商选择不合并，导致最终商品价格上升。
We analyze how consumer preferences for one‐stop shopping affect the (Nash) bargaining relationships between a retailer and its suppliers. One‐stop shopping preferences create ‘demand complementarities’ among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger incentives: first a standard double mark‐up problem and second a bargaining effect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induces suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power becomes large enough, then suppliers stay separated which raises final good prices. We also show that our result can be obtained when wholesale prices are determined in a non‐cooperative game and under two‐part tariffs.