A Laboratory Comparison of Uniform and Discriminative Price Auctions for Reducing Non-point Source Pollution
通过实验室实验，比较了统一定价和歧视性定价拍卖在补贴污染治理中的表现，发现统一定价拍卖中报价接近成本，而歧视性定价拍卖报价更高但市场整体表现更优。
<i>Auctions allow regulators to identify land management changes with substantial environmental benefit and low opportunity cost. This paper reports an experiment in which seller subjects compete in sealed-offer auctions to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the experimenter-regulator to subsidize pollution abatement. One treatment employs uniform-price auction rules, whereas another treatment employs discriminative price auction rules. We find that most offers in the uniform-price auction are within 2% of cost, whereas most offers in the discriminative price auction are at least 8% greater than cost. Nevertheless, the discriminative-price auction has superior overall market performance.</i>