Gasoline Prices, Welfare and Congestion Tolls
利用城市交通拥堵模型，分析汽油价格上涨对福利的影响，并探讨政府是否应调整拥堵费以应对油价上涨。
The effects of a gasoline price increase are examined using an urban model with traffic congestion. When congestion is unpriced, an increase in the gasoline price works as a Pigouvian tax on congestion activity, with the exception that the proceeds of the tax accrue to outsiders (the oil-exporting countries) instead of to the government. A concept of locational stability for urban models is developed. It is then shown that the effect of a gasoline price increase on welfare is negative when the locational equilibrium is stable. In the case where an optimal congestion toll can be levied, we investigate whether the government should respond to the gasoline price hike by lowering the toll. Under some normality assumption, the answer is in the affirmative.