The Banking Relationship's Role in the Choice of the Target's Advisor in Mergers and Acquisitions
分析目标公司在并购中是否聘请银行顾问以及选择有密切关系银行的影响因素，发现先前银行关系强度、竞标方顾问声誉和交易复杂性是关键，且关系越强股东异常回报越高，表明银行的认证作用。
Abstract We analyse the factors influencing the target company's choice of bank advisor in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We first examine the choice of hiring an advisor, which is nontrivial, since in one‐third of transactions our sample target companies did not hire one. We also analyse the choice to hire as advisor a bank with a strong prior relationship with the company (i.e., the main bank). Using data on 473 European M&A transactions completed in the period 1994–2003, we find evidence that the decision to hire an advisor depends on three main factors: (i) the intensity of the previous banking relationship, (ii) the reputation of the bidder company's advisor, and (iii) the complexity of the deal. We also investigate the impact of the bank advisor on shareholder wealth. We find that the abnormal returns of target company shareholders increase with the intensity of the previous banking relationship, thus indicating a ‘certification role’ on the part of investment banks.