Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size
用一个两国模型分析国际一体化对税收结构的影响，重点关注国家规模差异。规模差异加剧非合作行为的低效率，小国在税率协调中可能受损，但最低税率对双方有利。
Closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures. this paper uses a simple two-country model to address a range of policy concerns that consequently arise, focusing particularly on the role of national size. Differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency due to non-cooperative behavior, harming both countries. The smaller country would lose form harmonization to any tax rate between those of the non-cooperative equilibrium, but both countries would gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range. The fully optimal response to freer cross-border trade, however, may be to do absolutely nothing.