PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN GERMANY: THE IGNORED RISK SELECTION PROBLEM
研究了德国公共与私人健康保险之间的风险选择，发现私人保险受益于健康恶化者转向公共保险，建议建立风险调整转移支付以避免竞争扭曲。
We investigate risk selection between public and private health insurance in Germany. With risk-rated premiums in the private system and community-rated premiums in the public system, advantageous selection in favor of private insurers is expected. Using 2000 to 2007 data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), we find such selection. While private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment, they profit from an increase in the probability to switch from private to public health insurance of those individuals who have experienced a negative health shock. To avoid distorted competition between the two branches of health care financing, risk-adjusted transfers from private to public insurers should be instituted.