THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION IN MARKETS WITH NAÏVE CONSUMERS
研究了在竞争性市场中，当存在天真消费者时，公民消费者是否会支持消除行为低效的监管政策，发现无监管市场会导致无谓损失和收入再分配，而消费者对监管的支持有限。
In a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add-ons, we investigate the conditions under which citizen-consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral inefficiencies induced by naïve consumers. Unregulated competitive markets have two effects: they produce deadweight losses, and they redistribute income away from biased consumers. Both unbiased and naïve consumers believe that they benefit from this redistribution (the naïve consumers are wrong), so support for efficiency-improving regulation is limited. Extending our model to consumers with partial sophistication about their naïveté, we predict patterns of regulation consistent with the form and timing of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009.