Optimum Fishing Capacity and International Transfer of Excess Allowable Catches
研究了随机波动的鱼类资源由不同国家管理时，最优船队规模如何确定，以及允许捕捞配额跨国转移对利润和全球最优的影响，发现免费转移会导致过度捕捞和租金消散，而附带支付的转移更接近全局最优。
This paper considers optimum fleet capacity for fish stocks that vary randomly and are managed by separate states. Assigning a particular fleet to a particular stock will be less profitable than allowing fleets to move between stocks. Transfer of excess catch quotas between states improves profitability, but produces a global optimum only if payments are attached to the transfer. A free transfer of excess quotas results in overcapacity and dissipation of rents. A Nash bargaining solution with respect to transfer prices, but without side payments, gives solutions very close to the global optimum.