Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory; Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion
综述了高价拍卖中的投标理论及实验研究，并报告了两组新实验：通过收益凸变换降低投标者的风险厌恶，以及诱导风险中性行为。实验发现，投标者仅在利润潜力低于50美分盈亏平衡点时才会降低出价。
This article offers a brief survey of bidding theory in high price auctions, of experimental studies of behavior in such auctions, and of the interplay between the design and results of the experiments and efforts to further develop the theory. Two new series of experiments are reported. The first applies a convex transformation of payoffs in an attempt to induce a lowering of subject bids "as if" the bidders had become less risk averse. The second applies a method for inducing any prespecified utility function for risky choices on an individual. It is used to induce "as if" risk-neutral behavior. Both series use baseline control to "calibrate" the hypothesized effect of the procedures on "risk-averse" behavior. A close examination of individual bidding suggests that subjects bid less only when the profit potential is below the 50 cent "break-even" level. Above this 50 cent potential profit level, subjects tend to bid relatively higher. This can be interpreted as a type of "satisficing" behavior in which subjects attempt to do at least as well under the quadratic transformation as in the baseline experiments.