新李嘉图框架下政府债务与赤字的政治理论

A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework

American Economic Review · 1987
被引 306
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

在新李嘉图框架下,分析个体能力差异导致部分人受遗产约束,通过投票征税和发债增加当前消费,挤出资本并影响利率,进而推导多数规则下债务与赤字扩大的条件。

Abstract

Individuals differ in abilities. Some are bequest constrained even in a neo- Ricardian world. They vote taxes to issue bonds to be paid by taxes on future generations, thereby increasing current consumption, crowding-out capital, reducing wage rates, and increasing the interest rate. Therefore even unconstrained individuals are not indifferent to the size of government debt Conditions conducive to larger debt and deficits are derived when each of the living generations determines current taxes, Social Security benefits and the national debt by majority rule.

政府债务财政赤字新李嘉图框架代际转移