Financial Expertise as an Arms Race
研究发现，中介交易的企业有过度投资金融专长的动机。专长虽能通过信息优势阻止对手讨价还价，但竞争者的对等投资会抵消这一优势，且在波动加剧时引发流动性崩溃，损害交易收益。
ABSTRACT We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise. In our model, expertise improves firms’ ability to estimate value when trading a security. Expertise creates asymmetric information, which, under normal circumstances, works to the advantage of the expert as it deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties. This advantage is neutralized in equilibrium, however, by offsetting investments by competitors. Moreover, when volatility rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity, destroying gains to trade and thus the benefits that firms hope to gain through high levels of expertise.