Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking
研究为何存款保险制度在1980年代初出现重大问题，提出竞争加剧导致银行特许权价值下降，进而促使银行增加资产风险和降低资本，并用1970-1986年85家大型银行控股公司的数据验证该假说。
A fixed-rate deposit insurance system provides a moral hazard for excessive risk taking and is not viable absent regulation. Although the deposit insurance system appears to have worked remarkably well over most of its 50-year history, major problems began to appear in the early 1980s. This paper addresses the puzzle of why major problems began to arise in the early 1980s and not sooner. ; The hypothesis is that increases in competition caused bank charter values to decline, which, in turn, caused banks to- increase default risk through increases. in asset risk and reductions in capital. This hypothesis is tested using pooled cross section time-series data for the 1970-1986 period for a sample of 85 large bank holding companies.