Rationing and Optimality in Overlapping Generations Models
研究了代际交叠模型中配给均衡的最优性，提出价格调整规则可克服配给模型的价格刚性批评，为动态非市场出清条件下的价格理论提供基础。
The theory of overlapping generations models provides examples of economies where the first welfare theorem of static finite economies fails to hold. Since the discovery of this result, several authors have examined the relationship between competitive equilibria and Pareto optimal allocations, although they have systematically ignored alternatives to the competitive mechanism as the only allocation rule. To our knowledge, the question of whether a different allocation mechanism may perform better than the competitive one has not been posed. One alternative to the competitive allocation rule is provided by the theory of equilibria with rationing which has been developed extensively for static finite economies. Such models have been under constant criticism because they provide no or very little explanation as to why prices are fixed at non-Walrasian levels, although binding quantity constraints imply a clear signal as to how prices should adjust. Therefore, if the model of quantity rationing can be placed in a full dynamic framework where prices adjust from one period to the next, the criticism of assumed and unexplained price rigidity could be overcome. By adopting the approach of the law of supply and demand, i.e., demand rationing implies price increases and supply rationing implies price decreases, a well-defined class of price adjustment rules may be obtained which provides a first step toward a theory of price dynamics under nonmarket-clearing conditions. Optimality properties of rationing equilibria in static finite economies have been studied by several authors. Balasko (1979, 1982), BOhm and Muller (1977) and Dreze and Muller (1982) examined the question of different rationing equilibria for the same set of prices, whereas Bohm (1984)