The Dynamics of Welfare Fraud: An Econometric Duration Model in Discrete Time
建立了一个离散时间计量模型，分析福利领取者虚报收入的欺诈行为持续时间，发现欺诈回报增加会延长欺诈期，但整体欺诈水平较低。
An important source of errors in transfer payments programs is the fraudulent misreporting of earnings received by recipients. We propose a model of the recipient's decision to report income and the expected penalties if caught engaging in fraud. We discuss several features of the detection and penalty structures in the AFDC and Food Stamps programs and present estimates of a model of the duration of fraudulent earnings-misreporting episodes. We find that recipients respond to increases in the returns to fraud by lengthening their episodes of misreporting. However, the level of fraudulent activity at any given time is rather low.