Improving Takeup of Health Insurance Program: A Social Experiment in France
通过随机实验，研究了法国穷人补充健康保险代金券项目参与率低的原因，发现提高代金券金额有微小但显著的正向影响，而邀请参加信息会议反而降低了参与率。
This paper is based on a randomized experiment conducted in order to understand the low takeup rate of a complementary health-insurance voucher program for the poorest in France. We explore two of the main hypotheses put forward to explain low enrollment: difficulties in accessing information about the program and a voucher amount considered to be too low. Results show that a voucher increase has a small but significant effect on takeup and the invitation to an information meeting discourages it. This study confirms the difficulties that are faced in increasing the health-insurance coverage of poor populations via subsidy programs.