为什么资本雇佣劳动:一个讨价还价的视角

Why capital hires labor: A bargaining perspective

American Economic Review · 1993
被引 120
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

从讨价还价角度解释为何资本雇佣劳动,指出当生产需要不可合约的特定物质资产投资时,资本家企业能防止准租金被工人侵占,而劳动管理企业则出现在需要专用人力资本但通用物质资产的领域。

Abstract

Organizational forms often serve as vehicles for the appropriation of quasi-rent. Capitalist firms typically emerge when production requires noncontractible investments in specific physical assets because worker control would divert quasi-rents away from ass et owners ex post. Conversely, labor-managed firms tend to emerge in niches requiring specialized human capital but general-purpose physi cal assets. A key result is that capitalist firms can persist in competitive markets even when labor-managed firms would yield a larg er total surplus. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.

资本雇佣劳动准租金侵占资产专用性企业组织形式