Consumer Protection and the Incentive to Become Informed
研究消费者保护政策如何影响消费者了解市场最佳交易的激励，发现价格上限会降低信息获取激励，可能导致消费者支付更高价格；而拒绝营销的能力会削弱价格竞争，使所有消费者境况变差。
We discuss the impact of consumer protection policies on consumers’ incentives to \nbecome informed of the best deals available in the market. In a market with costly \ninformation acquisition, we find that imposing a cap on suppliers’ prices reduces the \nincentive to become informed of market conditions, with the result that prices paid \nby consumers (both informed and uninformed) may rise. In a related model where \nconsumers have the ability to refuse to receive marketing, we find that this ability \nsoftens price competition and can make all consumers worse off.