Uncertainty and Monetary Policy in a Wage Bargaining Model
在工资谈判模型中，货币与实际总量的不确定性增加会推高均衡失业率，且均衡失业率取决于货币政策制度的选择，因为该选择影响工资制定者面临的不确定性。
In a wage bargaining model, increased uncertainty concerning monetary and real aggregates is shown to give rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate. Moreover, the equilibrium unemployment rate is found to depend on the choice of monetary policy regime, as this choice affects the uncertainty wage setters face when setting the nominal wage rate. It is also shown that the equilibrium inflation rate may depend on uncertainty in such a way that increased uncertainty gives rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate as well as a higher equilibrium inflation rate - or what has been called stagflation.