Wage-Homestead Tenancies: Technological Dualism and Tenant Household Size
研究了发展中国家一种常见但少被关注的租佃形式，即用劳动换取宅基地和工资。模型分析了地主与佃户地块的技术二元性，以及地主对佃户家庭规模的偏好，发现计时工资下地主更偏好大家庭，且道德风险可能阻碍宅基地技术创新。
A widespread but little-studied tenancy in the developing world entails the exchange of labor for access to a homestead and a wage. This paper models two distinguishing features of this tenancy: technological dualism between the landlord's and tenants' plot, and landlord preferences over tenant household size. When wages are time denominated, moral hazard may provide incentive for landlords to resist innovation on the homestead. Landlords are shown to prefer larger tenant households under a time wage than under piece-rate. I argue that landlord preferences over tenant household size may have important effects that are ignored in the literature.