PUBLIC UTILITIES IN EGALITARIAN LDC's: THE ROLE OF BRIBERY IN ACHIEVING PARETO EFFICIENCY
研究指出欠发达国家平等主义理想导致资源低效配置，生产性个体通过贿赂获取公共设施优先使用权，但官僚将贿赂视为系统性收入后反而加剧低效。
This article points out that the egalitarian ideals adopted by many Less Developed Countries (LDC's) often lead to an inefficient allocation of resources because productive and unproductive agents are given equal access to public facilities. Productive agents then find it worthwhile to bribe their way into obtaining differential access to such public facilities —e.g., the telephone system. As long as bureaucrats look upon such bribes as windfall gains, the efficiency of the economic system can be improved. In practice, however, LDC bureaucracies often come to look upon such incomes as a systematic part of their remuneration and this leads them to pursue bribes rather than carry out their appointed duties; as a result, the system as a whole becomes increasingly inefficient.