When does it take a Nixon to go to China?
构建了一个模型，解释为何有时“不可能”的政党会推行重大政策转变，如民粹政党搞市场化改革或鹰派推动和平。模型认为，当政者比选民更了解政策优劣，但偏好信息不完全，导致政策可信度取决于决策者与政策的匹配。
Substantial changes in policy are sometimes implemented by "unlikely" parties; for example, radical market-oriented reforms by populist parties and substantial steps towards peace by "hawks" like Begin or Nixon. To account for such episodes, we develop a framework in which incumbent politicians have more information than the voting public about the state of the world, and hence about which policies are optimal. Politicians are unable to transmit fully this information, since there is also incomplete information about their preferences. We conclude that popular support for a policy, or its "credibility," depends on the policymakerpolicy pair.