Pegging and stabilization policy in developing countries
综述了汇率钉住的理论文献，发现钉住汇率能降低通胀和波动、促进增长，但可能限制应对冲击的能力，并基于发展中国家数据验证了这些关联。
I review the case for pegging the exchange rate by surveying the recent theoretical literature on the choice of exchange rate regimes. This literature suggests that by enhancing the transparency or controllability of monetary policy, pegging may be more effective in lowering inßation expectations than other targets (such as money growth). However, under certain conditions a peg may be vulnerable to shifts in expectations. A peg also may require greater Þscal restraint by limiting the availability of inßation tax revenue; however, given certain economic distortions, policymakers may Þnd it less costly to adopt expansionary Þscal policies under a peg than under a ßoat. Pegging may stimulate growth by enhancing international trade or investment. However, it may reduce welfare by restricting the ability of policymakers to offset shocks. I also examine how pegging is associated with inßation and output in a sample of developing countries using a new exchange rate classiÞcation method. I Þnd that a pegged exchange rate is associated with lower inßation and inßation volatility and with faster growth and similar output volatility. However, the theoretical survey suggests that any inferences should be drawn with care. 1.