The Role of Multilateral Institutions in the Market for Sovereign Debt
研究了债权国政府为何难以避免主权违约，并指出通过独立的多边机构可帮助政府承诺不干预，从而促使债务偿还，模型还解释了近年债务减免操作。
Creditor country governments have an interest in avoiding defaults by sovereign debtors because default sanctions may be costly to their citizens. As a result, a standard bargaining model predicts that debtors do not repay in equilibrium, even if the threat of sanctions is credible on the part of the banks. By contracting with a third party, such as a multilateral institution with some degree of independence, creditor country governments can precommit not to intervene. In equilibrium, when debt renegotiation occurs, the sovereign receives a subsidy from the multilateral agency. The model is used to interpret recent debt reduction operations. Copyright 1994 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.