Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium
用博弈论和一般均衡模型分析军费开支，说明重复互动下威胁惩罚无法实现裁军，军费波动源于经济波动，且政府行为方式影响两者关系。
To develop a positive, economic theory of military spending, this analysis focuses on a game-theoretic, general equilibrium model of international conflict, in which consumption, peaceful investment, and military spending are endogenously determined. The analysis illustrates that when there is repeated interaction between nations, a game of threats and punishments generally will not support a disarmament outcome and that fluctuations in military spending can be an endogenous result of fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. Furthermore, the analysis shows how the relation between aggregate economic activity and military spending qualitatively depends on whether governments are acting opportunistically or cooperatively. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.