Insider Trading In A Rational Expectations Economy
构建模型分析内幕交易的经济效率，发现禁止内幕交易可能实现帕累托改进，因为外部投资者预期被利用会减少投资，而内幕交易者的损失可能超过其交易收益。
It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading. In this article, an opposing efficiency argument is formalized. The model incorporates an investment stage followed by a trading stage. If "outsiders" expect "insiders" to take advantage of them in trading, outsiders will reduce their investment. The insiders' loss from this diminished investor confidence may more than offset their trading gains. Consequently, a prohibition on insider trading may effect a Pareto improvement. Insiders are made better off if they can precommit not to trade on their privileged information; government regulation accomplished exactly this. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.