Threat Positions and the Resolution of Environmental Conflicts
研究一家污染企业在拥有优先排污权时，通过承诺高于效率和利润最大化的产量来威胁受害者，并分析为让威胁可信而进行的不可逆投资必须不低于利润最大化投资水平。
In the classic externality problem of one polluting firm and a passive victim we consider bargaining when the firm has the prior right to pollute. Assuming that a threat made prior to bargaining is perceived to be credible, the firm will commit itself to an output level that is higher than both the efficient and profit-maximizing levels. In an extension, we assume that the firm makes an irreversible investment in production capability to give its threat credibility. We show that a credible investment must be greater than or equal to the profit-maximizing investment.