Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries and Mergers
分析成本不对称企业在数量竞争重复博弈中的默契合谋，研究资产转移对合谋可持续性的影响，为并购政策提供启示。
This article contributes to the analysis of tacit collusion in quantity-setting supergames involving cost-asymmetric firms. Asymmetry is dealt with by assuming that firms have a different share of a specific asset that affects marginal costs. The model extends optimal punishment schemes in the style of Abreu (1986, 1988) and provides conditions for industrywide collusion to be enforced. From the analysis of the impact of asset transfers on the sustainability of tacit collusion, merger policy implications can be drawn. In particular, I show that if the merger induces an increase in the inequality of asset holdings, this will hinder collusion.