Sourcing from the Enemy: Horizontal Subcontracting in Highway Procurement
研究了加州高速公路建设拍卖中水平分包对投标策略的影响，发现分包会软化竞争者的报价，但中标价与分包无关，表明效率动机驱动交叉供应。
I empirically consider the effect of horizontal subcontracting on firm bidding strategies in C alifornia highway construction auctions. Subcontractors are hired by prime contractors prior to the auction, and the subcontractor may also be a competitor in the primary auction. While horizontal subcontracting may improve productive efficiency, it softens the horizontal subcontractor's bid strategy, since winning the auction may entail losing subcontracting business. I find that while each additional competitor supplied by the firm is estimated to increase its bid by 1.4 per cent, the winning bid is uncorrelated with horizontal subcontracting. This points toward an efficiency motive for cross‐supply.