The Role of Incentives for Opening Monopoly Markets: Comparing GTE and BOC Cooperation with Local Entrants
利用原始数据，比较了本地电话市场新进入者AT&T与GTE及贝尔公司的谈判，发现差异化激励导致贝尔公司比GTE更积极地促进市场进入，表现为更快的协议、更少的诉讼和更优惠的网络接入价格。
While the 1996 Telecommunications Act requires all incumbent local telephone companies to cooperate with local entrants, section 271 of the Act provides the Bell companies but not GTE additional incentives to cooperate. Using an original data set, I compare the negotiations of AT&T, as a local entrant, with GTE and with the Bell companies in states where both operate. My results suggest that the differential incentives matter: The Bells accommodate entry more than does GTE, as evidenced in quicker agreements, less litigation, and more favorable prices offered for network access. Consistent with this, there is more entry into Bell territories.