CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives
检验CEO股票期权的风险激励效应是否促使管理者承担更多风险。通过并购样本发现，并购前后股票收益方差之比与期权风险激励正相关，且企业规模有调节作用；更广泛的样本也显示期权风险激励与后续收益波动正相关，小企业更显著。
Abstract: We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.