Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation
研究在理性储蓄、凸性技术和无外部性的条件下，历史财富分布能否影响长期产出和不平等。模型考虑均衡短期金融契约，贫困代理人因道德风险和有限责任面临信贷约束，其议价能力决定是否存在贫困陷阱或财富持续增长。
Can historical wealth distributions affect long-run output and inequality despite “rational” saving, convex technology and no externalities? We consider a model of equilibrium short-period financial contracts, where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability. If agents have no bargaining power, poor agents have no incentive to save: poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes, with no interclass mobility. If instead agents have all the bargaining power, strong saving incentives are generated: the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and “history” does not matter eventually.