Optimal Advice for Monetary Policy
研究当建议可能不被采纳时，如何给出最优货币政策建议。作者通过简单宏观经济模型证明，建议者不应推荐最优政策规则，因为积极建议会增加政策不确定性，并求解了建议者应使用的规则。
This paper addresses how to give optimal advice about monetary policy when it is known that the advice may not be heeded. The authors examine a simple macroeconomic model in which monetary policy has the ability to stabilize output by offsetting exogenous shocks to aggregate demand. The optimal policy rule for such a model is easily derived, but an advisor who knows that his advice may not be followed should not recommend the optimal policy rule. This is true because, in giving activist advice, such an advisor increases uncertainty about what monetary policy will be followed. The authors solve for the rule that such an advisor should use in giving advice. Coauthors are Miles S. Kimball, N. Gregory Mankiw, and David N. Weil. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.