Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Effect of Legal Structure on Dispute Costs and Wages
利用加拿大公共部门合同数据，研究集体谈判立法对争议成本和工资的影响，发现强制仲裁虽降低争议成本但推高工资，政策制定者面临权衡。
This paper examines the impact of collective-bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of Canadian public-sector contracts. The authors' results suggest that policymakers designing collective-bargaining legislation face a trade-off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages. Dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective-bargaining legislation exists. Hence, a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs. However, the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.